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The Arbitrator as Agent 3 award was procured by fraud, corruption, or undue means; 8 if the arbitrators exhibited evident partiality or corruption; 9 if the arbitrators violated norms of a fair hearing; 10 or if the arbitrators exceeded their powers.
11 For many years, courts have also utilized the standard that arbitral awards are to be vacated if they exhibit "manifest disregard" for the law. 12 This test can be traced back at least to dictum in the case of Wilko v Swan, 13 and has gone largely, if not entirely, unquestioned in the intervening several decades.
14 Despite acceptance of manifest disregard of the law as a basis for vacatur, courts and scholars have argued over what exactly constitutes manifest disregard. In order to limit the scope of review, most agree that manifest disregard means more than an arbitrator making a clear error in law, or even a gross error in law. 15 Although there is wide agreement on what manifest disregard is not, it is not clear what exactly it is. There has been some convergence on the idea that disregard is manifest when "(1) the arbitrator knew of a governing legal principle yet refused to apply it or ignored it altogether, and (2) the law ignored by the arbitrator was well-defined, explicit and clearly applicable to the case." 16 Another opinion says that error of law amounts to manifest disregard only if the error is "obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator. Moreover, the term 'disregard' implies that the arbitrator appreciates the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decides to ignore or pay no attention to it." 17 Judicial application of manifest disregard had been unstable. One commentator writes that although "it was nearly impossible, until about 1997, to find a case vacating an arbitration award in reliance on the 'manifest disregard of law' doctrine, since that time some courts 8 9 USC § 10(a)(1). 9 9 USC § 10(a)(2). 10 9 USC § 10(a)(3). 11 9 USC § 10(a)(4). 12 There is also a judicially created exception that is utilized on occasion. See note 40 and accompanying text. 13 346 US 427, 436-37 (1953 21 the arbitrator was aware of the law but believed that the law should change. 22 The Second Circuit overturned the arbitrator, holding that his actions exhibited manifest disregard of the law. 23 Some have argued that manifest disregard of the law creates perverse incentives for arbitrators. 24 Arbitrators might seek to minimize the legal reasoning in their awards to avoid being second-guessed by judges. In particular, they might obfuscate the grounds for their interpretations to avoid appearing like they have misapplied statutes. Perhaps to ward off this pressure, some courts now take into account arbitrators' failures to explain the reasoning behind their awards. 25 A requirement to give reasons, however, increases the cost of arbitration. This is one illustration of how the level of scrutiny applied to awards will affect the viability of arbitration as an effective and efficient substitute for judicial dispute resolution.
Perhaps because of its vagueness, manifest disregard is often claimed by parties seeking to vacate an award. One study of several hundred state and federal cases challenging employment arbitration awards over three decades found that manifest disregard of the law 18 
The Arbitrator as Agent 5 was the most frequently invoked grounds by a party seeking vacatur.
26
Though asserted in 35.1 percent of trial court cases and 30.4 percent of appellate cases in the sample, the challenges were only successful in 7.1 percent of trial court cases and 8.2 percent of appellate cases in which they were raised. 27 Other studies have found comparable results.
28
Courts have also varied their approaches. The Seventh Circuit has long exhibited some suspicion about so-called nonstatutory bases of judicial review of awards, 29 but has also occasionally utilized them.
30
Other circuits have adopted their own distinctive approaches, so that there appears to be profound regional variation in the availability of a manifest disregard grounds for vacating awards. 31 These muddy legal waters have produced myriad calls for reform, and, on occasion, a judicial decision that seeks to clarify this state of affairs. Both Watts and Hall Street fall into this category.
II. WATTS AND ITS CRITICS
George Watts sold Tiffany products in Wisconsin under a contractual arrangement. When Tiffany announced that it was terminating the arrangement, Watts sued for breach of contract and a violation of Wisconsin's Fair Dealership Law. The parties agreed to arbitrate, and the arbitrator delivered an award extending Watts's arrangement, but failing to award Watts his costs. Watts argued that the Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law provided that parties are entitled to attorneys' fees in any case in which they prevail, so the failure of the arbitrator to award fees constituted a manifest disregard of the law, requiring vacatur.
32
In his majority opinion, Judge Easterbrook rejected this claim wholly. He first reviewed some of the difficulties courts have had applying the manifest disregard standard by citing two alternative read- 33 He then proposed a new and novel reading of manifest disregard, namely that it would be found when an arbitral order requires the parties to violate the law or does not adhere to the legal principles specified by contract. 34 The latter condition would arguably render the award unenforceable under 9 USC § 10(a)(4), which allows a court to vacate an award if the arbitrators exceeded their powers. 35 Thus we are left with a reading that the judicially created principle of manifest disregard would serve as an independent basis for setting aside an award only when an arbitrator directs parties to violate the law.
Easterbrook rests his opinion on agency theory. Arbitrators are agents of the parties, hired to resolve a dispute, and hence ought to be able to exercise powers delegated to them by their principals. So long as the principals have the ability to exercise a certain power, they can delegate the power by contract to an agent. As Easterbrook points out, if Watts and Tiffany had agreed to settle their differences without Tiffany paying Watts's legal fees, the law could scarcely intervene. 36 When the arbitrator-agent issues a decision to the same effect, why should the law revisit that decision? As Easterbrook succinctly puts it, "[W]hat the parties may do, the arbitrator as their mutual agent may do."
37
On its face, this claim seems to overreach. Arbitrators are creatures of contract, exercising powers delegated by the parties, but they are also to some degree operating under state authority. Courts super- 1987) , the standard is simply whether the arbitrator did interpret the contract. Id at 1194-95 (emphasizing that "[i]f they did, their interpretation is conclusive"). Hypothetically, an arbitrator could interpret a contract stipulating New York law as allowing New Jersey law to be applied in the dispute. That would be an act of interpretation, however implausible. So under the older standard, it might seem to be immune from review. The solution is to hold that some interpretations are so implausible as not to be considered interpretation at all. See id at 1195. 36 See Watts, 248 F3d at 580. 37 Id at 581. 
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The Arbitrator as Agent 7 vise the arbitration, supporting and constraining it in various ways, including appointing arbitrators when one party refuses to do so. 38 For this reason, arbitrators are not pure agents of parties, and parties may be able to get away with more in a settlement than an arbitrator could in an award. Parties can resolve to decide their disputes by coin flip, but a court would hardly appoint an arbitrator to do so, even if a contract so stipulated. 39 Parties in a settlement might produce an agreement that violates public policy, which is a basis for nonenforcement of arbitral awards in some jurisdictions. 40 These examples illustrate that arbitrators are limited in their ability to act purely as agents of the parties.
As Judge Ann Claire Williams argued in concurrence, the majority opinion seems effectively to end the doctrine of manifest disregard as an independent basis for setting aside arbitral awards in the Seventh Circuit. 41 For it is difficult to imagine an arbitrator ordering parties to violate existing rules of law, and earlier cases had held that arbitrators could not do so anyway. 42 As a general matter, the law seeks to avoid regulatory traps-situations in which upholding one legal obligation requires a violation of another. So the universe of cases in which manifest disregard might serve as an independent basis for setting aside the award shrank dramatically. The only remaining analytic issue was whether it had shrunk to zero.
Easterbrook's opinion was subject to scholarly critique at the time. 43 45 Later, the Seventh Circuit clarified that manifest disregard would not provide an independent basis for review even in the hypothetical case, because the purported order to violate the law would constitute an arbitrator exceeding her powers, and thus would already fall within the statutory grounds of § 10(a)(4).
46
Note that the hypothetical requires the court to scrutinize the contract at some minimum level. As Easterbrook points out, an arbitration clause that requires application of Wisconsin law would not be satisfied by an arbitrator explicitly applying New York law. 47 An arbitrator who did apply New York law would be exceeding her powers under the contract. Thus the excess-of-powers prong of the FAA requires some scrutiny of the award, essentially to determine whether the arbitrator acted as an effective agent of the parties. 48 The Watts framework, then, turns the focus away from how well the arbitrators apply the law per se and looks at whether they effectively carry out the wishes of their principals in doing so. 
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The Arbitrator as Agent 9 dard. 51 But the Supreme Court was not explicit on this point, and a circuit split has emerged on whether "manifest disregard" survives Hall Street. 52 Hall Street also states that the parties cannot contract into higher levels of review by courts: they cannot, for example, state that the award will be unenforceable if the arbitrator's conclusions of law are erroneous. 53 On this point, there is some tension between Hall Street and the agency logic of Watts.
III. A DEFENSE OF AGENCY THEORY
Judge Easterbrook's characterization of the arbitrators as agents of the parties implicates basic principal-agent theory. This theory is concerned with situations in which one party (the principal) hires another that is more expert (the agent) in order to carry out a given task. 54 The canonical problem is that the agent might ignore the wishes of her principal. Agents may impose their own preferences, act in their own interests, or simply fail to exert appropriate effort in carrying out their assigned tasks. In the arbitration context, an arbitrator may simply decide a case in accordance with her own whims and conceal that basis from the parties. Or an arbitrator might not expend significant energy in trying to examine the chosen law governing the contract, leading to an error in interpretation.
Principal-agent theory has identified a variety of mechanisms to reduce agency slack. One such mechanism is screening in the labor market: parties can hire agents who have established a reputation for high-quality service. In the arbitration context, good agents will be arbitrators with a reputation for issuing sound decisions accurately interpreting the law. Another mechanism to control agents is to hire a second agent to monitor the first. This is a way of gaining information on the accuracy of the decision. Review of decisions becomes a device for agency control and for vindicating other systemic interests in uniform and accurate decisionmaking.
Consider screening first. Assume that there are two types of arbitrators, good and bad. Good arbitrators always interpret the law accurately (with a probability p = 1), while bad ones do so only with a [77:xxx probability p < 1. 55 A party evaluating a potential arbitrator will seek to determine if the arbitrator is good or bad, and will look for costly signals of quality: the arbitrator might, for example, have taken a leading position in an arbitral institution or have written articles and books on arbitration. Will screening serve adequately to reduce the agency problem of arbitrators? If the market for arbitrators is sufficiently robust, it might. But the market for arbitrators has certain imperfections. For example, there are no mandatory public records of arbitrator performance. Arbitrators need not produce publicly available opinions, and parties generally have no incentive to allow them to reveal the basis for the award. Only when an arbitrator makes an egregious error leading to a vacatur petition (such as manifestly disregarding the law outside the Seventh Circuit) will there be a public record of performance. Hence it is difficult for the parties to a contractual dispute to evaluate potential arbitrators in terms of their abilities to interpret law. Reputational considerations are, of course, a factor, but in the absence of reasoned decisions, even past users of a particular arbitrator cannot be sure their favorable outcome resulted from skilled arbitration or a combination of lazy arbitration and luck. 56 There will thus be certain informational asymmetries in the market for arbitrators, allowing bad arbitrators to remain in the market.
57
If screening does not mitigate all agency problems, what about hiring a second agent to evaluate the first? Judges might be viewed as helping to minimize agency problems in this way. But judges are not really hired by the parties. Rather, they are hired by the public to provide general judicial services.
Suppose, for a moment, that judges could be given instructions ex ante from the parties as to how closely to examine arbitral awards. If parties were able to contract into higher levels of judicial scrutiny, the judges could help to minimize arbitrator slack. The parties would be free to choose greater scrutiny, accepting the possibility of greater expense that would come with more extensive and frequent judicial review. Presumably such a system would allow potential arbitrators to trade on their knowledge of the relevant law, and thus improve the ex 55 This simple example assumes that judges always interpret the law accurately, and that parties do not want arbitrators to make better law than judges. In some contexts, parties might want to contract into private law that is of higher quality than that applied by judges. See Ware, Interstate Arbitration at 116 n 89 (cited in note 18). 56 Another relevant consideration is mandatory disclosure rules that require arbitrators to reveal past work. See Cal Code Civ Pro § 1281.9 ("[W]hen a person is to serve as a neutral arbitrator, the proposed neutral arbitrator shall disclose all matters that could cause a person aware of the facts to reasonably entertain a doubt that the proposed neutral arbitrator would be able to be impartial.").
57 I mean bad in the sense of having a propensity to misapply the law. ante screening function in arbitrator selection. Experts in legal interpretation would be able to market themselves as appropriate for the higher level of scrutiny, providing an effective signal of their skill, while less effective arbitrators would be hired for the default position of the FAA, in which scrutiny is minimal. An agency perspective, in short, would allow the standard of review to itself be subject to contract, in no case falling below the floor set by the FAA. This is the position that the Hall Street decision explicitly rejects. Judges cannot expand their monitoring of the arbitrator-agents simply because the party-principals want them to. In this view, judges are not second agents hired to monitor primary decisionmakers. They might more properly be considered agents of the legislature or the public as a whole, and these principals might suffer if parties to a particular contract could freely call on judges' limited time. 58 But this means the law essentially limits the ability to use monitors (or at least to use the best possible monitors, expert judges) to watch the arbitrator-agents in their interpretation of law.
59
One perverse result of the Hall Street decision might be greater pressure on courts to resolve full contract disputes. One rationale for not allowing parties to contract into higher levels of judicial scrutiny (though not fully articulated in the Hall Street decision, which relied on a textual analysis of the FAA) would be to enhance judicial economy-the public should not have to subsidize private dispute resolution. But after Hall Street, parties who want a legally proper decision cannot submit to arbitration, or at least will be less likely to do so, because there can be only minimal ex post monitoring of arbitral awards. 60 Like Watts, Hall Street limits the scope of review. But unlike 58 The agency framework might thus be consistent with the views of those who have advocated less deferential review than the "manifest disregard" standard. See Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Employment Claims, 72 NYU L Rev 1344, 1350-51 n 22 (1997) (arguing that arbitration of public law claims should be confirmed only where it is not "clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies" of the relevant statutes). See also Richard E. Speidel, Arbitration of Statutory Rights under the Federal Arbitration Act: The Case for Reform, 4 Ohio St J Disp Res 157, 206-12 (1989) (arguing that statutory rights may raise public law issues that cannot be solved by arbitration). The reason is that, in public law claims, judges are agents with two principals: the parties and the public. Less deferential review is a form of balancing the competing interests of multiple principals. 59 Note that judges are in some sense competing agents, as well as monitors of arbitration, for cases that do not go to arbitration stand a good chance of ending up in the courts. 60 Parties can, however, continue to contract for expanded review under state arbitration laws that have not followed the Hall Street approach. See, for example, NJ Stat Ann § 2A:23B-4 (West) (allowing "a party to an agreement to arbitrate or to an arbitration proceeding" to waive "the requirements of this act to the extent permitted by law"). See also 
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The Arbitrator as Agent 13 type" would want a level of scrutiny lower than de novo review: few would turn to arbitration if high scrutiny resulted in higher overall costs for arbitration. And the good-type arbitrator might be concerned with the judicial error associated with intensive review. Such errors would hurt the reputation of the good arbitrator more than the bad one. But all in all, the good-type would probably not fear a moderate level of review.) The point is that the standard of review will affect the mix of agents in the labor pool. A policy of no scrutiny will draw bad types. A policy of minimal scrutiny, such as under the FAA, will keep some bad types out: it will prevent arbitrators, for example, from applying New York law when they are instructed to apply Wisconsin law. But it will do nothing to hinder an arbitrator who applies Wisconsin law so poorly as to produce an obvious error. Given the existence of agency problems, the hands-off approach of the FAA after Hall Street may end up undermining the arbitration regime by drawing bad arbitrators. Letting parties designate the standard of review, on the other hand, would improve the functioning of the market for arbitrators by allowing good arbitrators to signal their status.
The problem of the standard of review is one of calibration. Parties will always be unwilling to arbitrate under a regime of de novo review, because it confers no advantages over going directly to court. But they will also be reluctant to arbitrate if the arbitrator is unlikely to resolve their dispute according to agreed-upon law. While the ideal point on the spectrum of standards is not completely clear, it seems fairly clear that Hall Street has not produced the right level of review. Watts may not do so either, but it surely provides a clearer conceptualization of how to think about it: arbitrators are agents of the parties, so we need a strong theory to interfere with the delegation by the party-principals. Hall Street does not provide such a theory.
CONCLUSION
Watts was a transitional case, foreshadowing the highly restrictive view of manifest disregard of the law as an independent basis for vacatur. 64 But its implications are much larger. Arbitrators who are faithful agents will have little to fear from a regime in which parties can demand nontrivial review of their interpretations of law. Allowing more rigorous review might lead to less frequent litigation of arbitral awards, because it may improve the quality of decisionmaking. It might also lead to better-reasoned awards, as arbitrators seek to dem-The University of Chicago Law Review [77:xxx onstrate that they have not made a clear error. The earlier state of affairs, under the manifest disregard standard, had the opposite effect. 65 As Rubins put it:
A rule that allows extra-statutory vacatur only where arbitrators explicitly acknowledge the proper law to be applied and proceed to ignore it simply encourages silence on the part of the arbitrators. . . . Under such an interpretation of "manifest disregard," the arbitrator has free rein to apply whatever rules of law he sees fit, as long as he keeps his mouth shut about the choice he has made, or states plainly that he is unaware of any contrary rule of law. 66 This can hardly be desirable from the point of view of the partyprincipals, or for arbitration as a whole. Arbitration is contractual dispute resolution, and this means that arbitrators are agents. The standard of review of arbitral awards sets the level of monitoring of the agents' interpretation of law. Some agents will prefer not to be subject to monitoring of their performance, and these are the agents who are happy with Hall Street. Other agents have no fear of monitoring. While specifying a universal standard of review applicable for all cases may be an inherently unstable venture, it seems clear that allowing the parties to set the standard, and to choose higher levels of monitoring by contract, will reduce agency slack and allow parties to determine what type of arbitrator they are hiring. Deferential review, in short, is not always pro-arbitration.
